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We would not expect insurgents to cel-ebrate the very state that they combat at all costs. In northern Côte d’Ivoire, however, the rebel movement of the Forces Nouvelles, the “New Forces,” not only engaged in a sustainable pro-
vision of public goods, they also created new modes of repre-
sentation that on the one hand built on the former experience 
of the state but simultaneously developed a sort of draft of how 
the nation should look like in the future. Both the iteration of 
the past into the present and the imagination of a promising 
future with a better state were less the subject of a closed dis-
course but much more at the center of highly attractive if not 
seductive performances. The nation as an imagined community 
(Anderson 2006, Hansen and Stepputat 2001) and its imaginary 
(Castoriadis 1998, Taylor 2003)—that is, the normative expecta-
tion how its members should live together—were themes that 
pervaded many ceremonial events staged by the rebels and their 
allies. Almost all ceremonies in the rebel-held part of the coun-
try rotated around this theme that had become more and more 
problematic over the past two decades: the Ivoirian nation. The 
inauguration of the monument for the unknown rebel soldier 
was one such occasion to make claims to its past, present, and 
future; another was the construction and opening of a cultural 
center (Förster in press). Probably the most impressive were, 
however, the festivities on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary 
of independence on August 7, 2010. 
The inherited images of the state were transformed into some-
thing different: into an image how a new Ivoirian nation could 
re-emerge after the end of the old nation-state (Fig. 1). The imag-
ination of the past was not a given but much more the outcome 
of the changing relationships between the different actors: “We 
must not think of imagination as a simple power but as a com-
plex series of processes” (Klein et al. 1983:15). Imagination is best 
conceptualized as a social practice that is an essential part of the 
actors’ agency (Emirbayer and Mische 1998). The rebel move-
ment and in particular its strongmen had a say in it, but it was 
much more shaped by the interaction between them and other 
actors, who articulated their claims and interests by how they 
engaged in the performances or abstained from them. These 
deeply political interactions shaped the images of the past and 
produced images of and for the future. As a social practice, 
imagination links the images of the past to the images of the 
future and vice versa. 
Images have a mental character, but they stimulate or lead to 
“real, material” pictures (Mitchell 1992) that the spectators saw 
when they attended the event. How these pictures looked, how 
they were embedded in the overarching ceremonial perfor-
mance of what is perhaps best and paradoxically called a postna-
tional nationalism, and how that worked on the social imaginary 
is the subject of this article. By showing how remembrance and 
projectivity together shape the production of images of the past 
and the future, I hope to address two weak points at opposing 
ends of the more theoretical literature: first, Benedict Anderson’s 
seminal work on the state as an imagined community (2006) 
adopts a narrow, Foucauldian understanding of discourse as a 
sequence of written or oral enouncements that relate to each 
other and frame what can be said and thought about a particular 
signifier, in this case the nation.1 Such an understanding of dis-
course largely ignores nonverbal statements and says virtually 
nothing about the power of images and pictures in the discur-
sive formation of nationalism. At the other end of the theoreti-
cal landscape, post-Marxist discourse analysis takes all possible 
expressions—written, oral, visual, olfactory, haptic—as parts of 
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discursive formations if they are perceived as intentional acts 
by the participants (Laclau 1996, 2000). Such an understanding 
ignores the specific character of sensory experience and implic-
itly presumes that visual “enouncements” work like their oral or 
written counterparts in a discursive formation. However, it is 
highly debatable to assume that pictures and visual experience 
produce sense the same way as written or oral language does. 
If there is a difference, we would have to acknowledge that pic-
tures evocate sense by other means, namely because they appre-
sent a structural context and not a linear, temporal narrative.2 
The more general question is whether it is appropriate to frame 
the relationship that links pictures as “discursive” (Förster et 
al. 2011). Such an alternative approach would lead to a perhaps 
more appropriate understanding how pictures relate to each 
other, why they sometimes enhance each other or why they clash 
under other circumstances. 
Secondly, acknowledging the deeply political character of 
a “pictorial” formation means to recognise that the collective 
memory of the past and its cultural heritage is inevitably politi-
cal, too. Hardly a new claim, it means that the nation as a signi-
fier is always bound to the present social imaginary and how the 
actors imagine the future. The question is not so much how the 
actors imagine the past but more how the practice of imagina-
tion creates social and political spaces that foster nascent picto-
rial formations.  
A MoMent of DislocAtion 
On August 7, 2010, the insurgents in northern Côte d’Ivoire 
staged independence ceremonies that, officially, should have had 
the same theme as their counterparts in the southern parts of 
the country, held by troops loyal to incumbent President Laurent 
Gbagbo: the fiftieth anniversary of independence from France. 
Then in its eighth year, the rebellion was well established in the 
North, the Center, and the West of Côte d’Ivoire. In almost all 
bigger towns, the rebels invited the population and civil society 
organizations to participate in the ceremonies. The biggest events 
were, unsurprisingly, those in Bouaké, where the insurgents 
have their military and administrative headquarters, and those 
in Korhogo, by far the biggest city in the North, counting about 
170,000 inhabitants. However, what the rebels did not know by 
then was that they were the only ones to organize ceremonies at 
that scale. The Gbagbo administration in the South attempted 
to stage its power in Abidjan but at the end of the day brought 
only a conference on “Independence and Future Perspectives in 
Sub-Saharan Africa” in Yamoussoukro off the ground.3 The large 
and pompous parade that should have taken place in the capital 
Yamoussoukro under the eyes of distinguished guests, includ-
ing heads of state from other African countries, was given up 
in favor of a very small, nonpublic ceremony at the presidential 
palace in Abidjan. Only the Nigerian vice-president participated. 
Though the ceremony was declared to be a commemoration 
of the glorious independence struggle, there was not much to 
remember. Those who had fought for independence or their 
successors were not invited or did not come. Most of them now 
belonged to opposition parties and obviously had no interest to 
be visible at a ceremony that was seen by many as an event in 
favor of the ruling party.4 Unsurprisingly, the northerners later 
interpreted the mere fact that the rebels were able to do more 
than the internationally recognized administration in the South 
as a sign of state weakness. 
My starting point is to what degree and how the visual imag-
ery of the ceremonial staging of the nation and the state as two 
separate entities is linked to a rupture in the political imagina-
tion. The political dislocation of the North and its population 
1 soldiers marching on 
the occasion of the fiftieth 
anniversary of independence 
from France in Korhogo, 
Côte d’Ivoire, august 2010. 
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had caused a break in the visual imagery of the nation and vice 
versa opened a space for new images. Taking imagination as an 
essential part of agency, it means that the staging of the ceremo-
nies built on three elements, namely habits and habitual prac-
tices, judgement, and, last but not least, imagination. The three 
elements always work together, but they do so to varying degrees. 
During the ceremonies, the habitual side became visible in the 
continuity of performances and pictures that once belonged to 
the state’s imagery. The rebels had appropriated its imagery and 
made it theirs, but the spectators were used to it and saw its pic-
tures at least to some degree as a part of their national heritage. 
As we shall see later, habitual practice can be creative because 
it generates a stable image of the past that may serve as a reli-
able basis for the future (Dalton 2004). Imagination, however, 
is about something that is not there—perhaps not yet—and that 
may guide the actors’ attempts to shape their own future. With-
out an imagination of what the social world and an appropriate 
political order should look like, there would be no agency, as the 
current revolutions in North Africa demonstrate. 
Imageries are more than merely the visual side of the con-
tested field that is framed by the political imagination of the 
actors. Because of their perceptual character, imageries work on 
the beholder. Accordingly, it would be a mistake to take the inde-
pendence ceremonies solely as a mirror of a changing political 
imagination; one has to understand the ceremonies as a social 
space where the agency of the actors is at stake—and on stage. To 
understand the ceremonies, one has to bring two strands of anal-
ysis together. Firstly, it is necessary to look at how the various 
stakeholders relate to each other and also to absent third parties, 
such as the institutions in the South and the very few represen-
tatives that they sent to the rebel held area after the signature 
of the Ouagadougou peace treaty in March 2007. Secondly, the 
work of the imageries needs to be addressed. In particular the 
presence of an older imagery that feeds into the emergence of 
new images is a dimension that tells us a lot about how pictures 
and images iterate from the past to the present and how they 
may then become part of the social imaginary. 
How the interaction of actors and imageries contributed 
to the discursive formation of a novel political imagination of 
the nation beyond the nation-state is then a wider theme that 
extends beyond the time horizon of this paper. However, the 
nascent postnational understanding of the nation does not only 
foster a new political imaginary, it also shapes the remembrance 
of already existing images. Some images that were once part of 
the state’s imagery and at the center of the social imaginary fade 
and literally disappear while others are maintained and even 
enhanced through the process. The once so dominant image of 
the first president as the founding father of the nation is a case in 
point. It faded out and is no longer part of the national imagery.  
But before looking at the imagery of the nation, I need to 
go into the history of the rebellion or, more precisely, into its 
discursive roots in the 1990s. When the first president, Félix 
Houphouet-Boigny, nicknamed FHB or simply le vieux, “the old 
man,” died in his 90s in 1993 after thirty-three years of reign, he 
left an ambiguous political heritage that had left a deep stamp 
on the political imagination in Côte d’Ivoire (see Comaroff and 
Comaroff 1999). After independence, he had adopted a policy of 
close cooperation with the former colonial power, France, and 
an inclusive strategy towards the many immigrants from the 
countries neighboring Côte d’Ivoire. Though his attempt to grant 
them dual citizenship had already failed in the 1960s, they were 
welcomed as a workforce that contributed to the wealth of the 
country. They held Ivoirian identity cards, but there was virtually 
no integration policy, at neither the communal nor the national 
level. This was not a problem as long as the country experienced 
a steady economic growth. Côte d’Ivoire in the 1970s and still 
through the 1980s was le pays de l’hospitalité, “the country of 
hospitality.” It hosted foreigners from almost all African nations. 
When Houphouet-Boigny died, roughly 25% of its population 
originated abroad, and Abidjan, its economic capital, was often 
called “the West African melting pot.” The political imagination 
of the country, then strongly fostered by the president and his 
ruling party, was one of a free and open society with a nation 
that shared no prejudices against its neighbors. 
But when Côte d’Ivoire experienced one economic downturn 
after the other, went through various structural adjustment pro-
grams and currency devaluation in 1994, shortly after the death 
of FHB, the imagination of the nation as an open community 
came under attack from more than one side. Henri Konan-
Bédié, the weak successor of “the old man,” wanted to prevent 
his strongest rival, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, from run-
ning for presidency. He made use of an idea that had circulated 
among artists, writers, and intellectuals since the 1970s, the noto-
rious Ivoirité, which is best translated into English as “Ivoirity” 
or “Ivoirianness.” Bédié developed it into a political instrument 
that served other purposes besides eliminating his strongest 
2 a soldier of the National army harassing an old 
man because of his identity paper shows that he has 
a Muslim name. Detail of a mural by sap héro at the 
Cultural Centre of Korhogo, 2006. 
 
vol. 45, no. 3 Autumn 2012 african arts  | 45
rival in the upcoming presidential elections of 1995. As a law, it 
stipulated that full citizenship was only granted to persons who 
could prove that their grandparents were born on Ivoirian soil—
a condition that only very few people in the interior could fulfill 
because, at the time of their forefathers, very few birth certifi-
cates were issued in these parts of the country. As an administra-
tive practice, Ivoirité meant endless harassment by policemen, 
custom officers, and other state officials, often leading to higher 
bribes and other “fees” that “full” citizens were not expected to 
pay. This practice aimed not only at migrants from other parts of 
Africa, it also targeted the Ivoirian population in the North and 
West of the country where ethnic identities crosscut national 
borders (Fig. 2). Having a family name from the North and in 
addition a Muslim given name meant that one was excluded 
from the nation as an imagined community. The bearers became 
subjects of a second category, deprived of citizen rights and 
many public services. 
The effects of Ivoirité are usually analyzed as a hardening of 
national identity, finally leading into an ethno-nationalist ide-
ology (Banégas 2006, Dozon 2000, Marshall-Fratani 2006). I 
believe, however, that this interpretation is wrong. Ivoirianness 
was not a reinforcement of national identity—on the contrary, 
it was an onslaught on it. Through the second half of the 1990s, 
it was no longer possible to imagine the nation as the com-
munity that FHB once had in mind. The daily reality increas-
ingly contradicted this political imagination. It also meant that 
the discursive formation, still officially promoted by President 
Bédié to demonstrate continuity with his political fosterfather 
FHB, could no longer cover what went on in many daily arenas 
where the state and its civil servants interacted with their sub-
jects. It threatened Ivoirian identity by creating a lack of possible 
identification—and thus generated the necessity and respective 
attempts to reformulate the now dislocated identities of what 
would become “the Northerners” and others. It was a moment of 
dislocation in the post-Marxist sense (Laclau 1996, Howarth et 
al. 2000). In simple words, Ivoirity set the stage for a new politi-
cal imagination—one that went beyond the usual limits of the 
nation-state.  
The second dislocation turned that quest for a new political 
imagination into a necessity. It was the failed coup d’etat of Sep-
tember 19, 2002. Because the insurgents could not replace the sit-
ting president Laurent Gbagbo and his government by politicians 
of their choice, they were obliged to formulate a political agenda 
that did not build on the usual imagery of the president as the 
father of the nation and the state as an institution with enormous 
powers, feeding the entire nation (Schatzberg 2001). They needed 
to articulate an alternative, together with another imagery of the 
state—one that filled the gap left by the failed coup. 
Due to the lack that Ivoirité created by dislocating the political 
imagination of the nation, it fostered a feeling of national crisis, 
which corresponded with the necessity to find new imaginary 
answers to the discursive dislocation. The rebels of course did 
not express this in the same vocabulary as I do here, but it is safe 
to say that they were very much aware of the necessity to cover 
over the imaginary gap that this dislocation had created. Proba-
bly, none of them would have put it in words at all, but the visual 
and performative practice is as eloquent as a text—if not more. 
August 7, 2010: Bringing the nAtion BAck in 
August 7 was not always Independence Day in Côte d’Ivoire. 
FHB had postponed it to December 7 because of the rainy sea-
son that often affected festivities in August. The rebels willingly 
accepted weather magic performed on their behalf to prove their 
close relations to the local population. Other preparations were 
kept secret among the insurgents and their close allies, the so-
called traditional hunter associations, the dozo.5 But what fol-
lowed was a conspicuous display addressing the entire population 
of the city of Korhogo. The interaction with the local population 
was always part of their public political agenda, and although they 
might feel a need to return to more autocratic actions, they at 
least framed such acts as a necessity that they, unfortunately, were 
not able to avoid. The public was invited to attend and to assist 
whenever possible. The ceremonial acts followed a written agenda, 
which was distributed to the dignitaries and influential persons 
as a printed flyer. It also circulated in restaurants and hotels. Yet 
it was not clear to all inhabitants if the ceremonies would take 
place, as the South under Gbagbo was planning similar events that 
might usurp theirs in both attention and funding. 
The place of the ceremonies was well chosen. It was a square 
in front of the tribune that was once erected for the parades of 
the state’s police and military. Its construction dated back to the 
independence ceremonies of 1964, which had also taken place in 
Korhogo. On that occasion, the city had received a grid of tar-
3 the Monument for the unknown soldier, 
erected by the rebels on the occasion of the sixth 
anniversary of the insurgency. It shows a rebel sol-
dier with a Kalashnikov and a hand grenade, painted 
in golden bronze. 2009.
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mac roads and a number of other facilities, among them a big 
hotel and a new residence for the president that he inhabited 
for one night. But since the state had passed away, the tribune 
had changed its character: now, the tribune faced a “Monument 
of the Unknown Soldier,” erected on the occasion of the sixth 
anniversary of the insurgency (Fig. 3). It depicted, of course, a 
rebel soldier carrying a Kalashnikov and a grenade in his hands. 
It had been erected between the tribune and the barracks of the 
former National Police, now accommodating a part of the rebel 
troops. The monument made the square a place of commemora-
tion where the imagery of the state met the recent history of the 
country, the rebellion, and its claims to political legitimacy. 
At the opposite end, the square merged seamlessly with Inde-
pendence Square at the bottom of the hill where the French had 
erected the residence of their prefect. The square was framed by 
two important administrative buildings, the prefecture on one 
side and the urban council on the other. Initially not much more 
than a roundabout in front of the former French buildings, it had 
become a site of memory, a lieu de mémoire where the nation 
became visible as a built environment and through a series of 
performances (Nora 1986). The traffic island at the center was 
the place where the French had once put up a flagpole to fly the 
tricolore. The postcolonial state had replaced it with its own tri-
colore. The rebels, however, held a competition and invited the 
fine artists of the city to come up with plans for a monument 
that would be built where the flagpole once stood. The pedestal 
was built, but in 2010, the monument was still not completed. It 
should, the rebel leader said, give the place another, a new mean-
ing, replacing the old sign of state domination by a sculpture 
that showed a man climbing up a pole that carried a star—also 
an emblem of the personal unit of commander Fofié Kouakou. 
Occupying the site and replacing the old sign of state domina-
tion was a means to distance rebel governance from the former 
state and its arbitrary political regime.
The independence ceremonies were expected to take place 
in this highly representative environment, beginning at Inde-
pendence Square and linking it to the other commemorative 
sites of the rebellion’s history. According to the agenda, a defile 
should have started at 9 am, but most dignitaries came much 
later, and the parade only got going at about 10:30 am. The 
parade began when the Chief Rebel Commander of the city, 
Fofié Kouakou, approached in his giant 4WD together with a 
small escort of bodyguards. His uniform was that of an official 
commander of a military zone, but complemented by elegant 
Cartier sun glasses and a brevet showing the star with the let-
tering “Fansara 110,” the name of the prison and the cell num-
(clockwise from top left)
4  Fofié Kouakou, Chief rebel Commander of 
Korhogo and Military Zone 5, on august 7, 2010. 
Kouakou is sought by the united Nations for war 
crimes committed in 2002 and 2003.
5 the prefect of Korhogo and Commander 
Kouakou inspecting the mixed guard of honor com-
posed by “loyal” and “rebel” soldiers. 2010.
6 rebel soldiers with old guns parading in front of 
the tribune of honor. 2010.
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ber where he was detained before he joined the rebel movement 
(Fig. 4). It became the name of the military unit that he had 
built up and now commanded. At his waistbelt, he carried a 
shiny silver gun, visible to everybody sitting on the tribune or 
standing on the other side of the square. 
The rebels had invited the official prefect who, according to 
the Ouagadougou peace treaty, should have reassumed office 
almost two years previously. Though the southern government 
had nominated the prefect, he usually stayed in Abidjan and 
travelled to Korhogo on rare occasions only. Turning down the 
invitation to participate in the independence ceremonies, how-
ever, would have been a plain statement about his marginal posi-
tion in the local political arena. The prefect arrived shortly after 
Commander Kouakou, wearing the official dark blue dress uni-
form of the state’s corps préfectural. While the audience around 
me whispered that was good that he came, they also observed 
that he apparently was not allowed to carry any weapon—while 
Kouakou displayed his gun overtly to the public (Fig. 5). The two 
men exchanged military salutes, and together they inspected the 
troops that had formed up on the square, the rebel commander 
walking a step behind the prefect. According to military proto-
col, the civil servant was of a higher status, but to the audience, 
it was clear who held real power in the city. The prefect was, they 
said, à la merci du commandant. The French term commandant 
here has a particular historical connotation, which is worth 
mentioning because it connects the present to the colonial past, 
when the French commander held absolute power in his county 
(Delavignette 1950). It was the title of the highest French rep-
resentative in the regional administrative body. Usually a mili-
tary officer, the commandant stood above democratic divisions 
of powers and had comprehensive judicial, legal, and executive 
rights, very much the same position that the rebel commander 
claimed for himself. 
The inspection started with the very small mixed unit that, 
since the Ouagadougou peace treaty, was supposed to bring sol-
diers of the two camps together. It consisted of only eighteen men, 
of whom the fifteen who were armed presented their arms to the 
commander and the prefect. Their automatic weapons were new, 
and their scarves were orange, white, and green, as in the flag of 
Côte d’Ivoire. The mixed brigade was immediately followed by a 
formation of rebel soldiers. Much more numerous, they carried 
ordinary, heavily used rifles and had scarves in green, but not in 
the other two colors of the Ivoirian tricolore. Their presentation of 
the rifles was as exact as that of the mixed brigade, as bystanders 
proudly remarked. “They are our boys,” said a journalist stand-
ing close by as he took photos of them. A young man shouted 
7 Dozo as “traditional” hunters with their ID badges. 2010.
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that their guns were old but that, with the help of god, they would 
continue to protect their fatherland. The prefect was then invited 
to give an address the population. He delivered a short speech in 
which he conjured the unity of the country. When he ended his 
speech, a civil servant of the new urban council presented his city 
as on its way to a promising future.  
Commander Kouakou and the prefect then took seats at the 
center of the tribune, from where they later followed the parade 
of the soldiers (Fig. 6). Next to them, the military officers of the 
UNOCI, the United Nation Peace Keeping Forces, took a seat. 
Like Kouakou and the prefect, they were wearing their uniforms. 
The tribune was then filled with representatives coming from the 
different quarters of the city, for instance quarter headmen and 
elders of the hunter associations. Before the beginning of the 
parade, four young girls and six musicians arrived, representing 
“the community of citizens from Burkina Faso” in Korhogo. The 
girls were dancing right in front of Commander Kouakou and in 
the end kneeled down to greet him while the prefect turned away 
from the scene. The performance was a deliberate political dem-
onstration and aimed at articulating a difference to the politics of 
ethnic exclusion of the Gbagbo administration in the South. 
This first part of the ceremony was a highly skilful display 
of state and rebel emblems. They often mixed or comple-
mented each other. To an outside observer, not familiar with 
the local imagery of the novel political order, it perhaps looked 
very much like an ordinary independence ceremony. But it 
was much more: it was a construction in which the different 
visual elements often competed and at times actually clashed. It 
apparently aimed at a symbolic integration, turning the visual 
references into a reality of its own. This became much more 
evident in the sequence that followed. 
the iMAginAtion of A Better civil orDer 
After the inspection of the rebel troops and the dancers’ per-
formance, the first group to parade was a private security com-
pany with its yellow motorcycles and cars and its uniforms in 
yellow and grey. Its employees guaranteed the security of the 
banks that had recently reopened. Their march was dominated 
by a display of their superior technical equipment. The men 
driving the powerful motorcycles had walkie-talkies, mobile 
phones, and other gadgets. 
Next came the dozo, the hunters. They were the most impor-
tant allies of the rebel forces and in charge of security in the 
inner parts of the city. They were very much the opposite of the 
security company. Unlike the military and quasi-military groups, 
they were not marching in rows of two or three. The hunters had 
adopted the order of ritual status that informed their internal 
organization and marched in two long lines following each other. 
8 Masks of the hunter association composed of 
antelope horns, wood, and fibers. 2010.
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One came from the association in southern Korhogo, the other 
from its northern part, the highest-ranking hunter marching at 
the end of each group. They all wore mud-brown shirts, often 
with the “traditional medicine” sewn in small packages, protect-
ing them against bullets and rendering them invisible when they 
were tracking an enemy or a thief. The badges that many of them 
had attached to their brown shirts documented that they had 
become part of the security forces under rebel domination (Fig. 
7). Though integrated into the new order, it was clear that they 
had and would always maintain their distinct, largely acepha-
lous organization. Their prominent position in the parade and 
the respect that they received showed that they were supposed 
to occupy a central place in the social and political order that 
increasingly emerged under rebel domination. 
Unlike the private security companies, the hunters displayed 
no modern technical equipment. Instead, they came with their 
masks and dances. These masks always represent wild animals 
that the hunters had killed during their nightly expeditions into 
the wilderness. The masks often incorporate a part of the animal, 
for instance the horns of an antelope or the tusks of a warthog 
(Fig. 8). Being part of the independence parade, they were not 
performing as usual. They were accelerating their dance right in 
front of the Ivoirian flag, which was understood by most specta-
tors as a continuation of greeting ceremonies that were usually 
addressed to the elders of the association (Fig. 9). An ensemble 
of musicians accompanied them and later led them to the tri-
bune, where the masks and the musicians bowed down to greet 
the rebel commander (Fig. 10). The march of the hunters was an 
extraordinary part of the parade and took nearly as long as the 
defile of the rebel troops earlier. The press and the two local TV 
stations extensively covered its most spectacular moments. 
When they ended, it was announced that the anciens combat-
ants, African soldiers who had fought on the side of the French 
during World War II and in Vietnam, would now parade to sup-
port la nouvelle nation, “the new nation.” It was only one very old 
man who slowly and solemnly went from one side of the square 
to the other. 
The incorporation of civil society organizations into the new 
political order was documented in the series of performances 
that followed. First came a troupe of cheer girls dressed in the 
national colors (Fig. 11), then a delegation of Korhogo’s boy 
scouts, followed by four soccer teams, also in national colors. 
Much more attractive, however, were the performances of three 
karate clubs; in particular, a young, good-looking women who 
shafted two strong men received much attention (Fig. 12). She 
did so very close to where the rebel commander was sitting, and 
he observed the act attentively. It was the only performance that 
received immediate applause. 
9  Warthog mask of the hunter association per-
forming in front of the Ivoirian flag. 2010.
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Local and international NGOs paraded then, one after the 
other. Many of them carried signboards that appealed for 
peace in the war-torn country. The sequence of their marches 
was understood by many as a comment on their importance: 
La Formation Civique et Citoyenne, “Civil and Civic Train-
ing” started in orange T-shirts, followed by the “National Civic 
Service Programme”6 in four lines, and a support organiza-
tion for the defunct University of Korhogo. The defile was then 
interrupted by an incident: a young man holding a half empty 
bottle of beer in his hand paraded all alone from one side of 
the square to the other, staring at the audience and shouting 
that Côte d’Ivoire was in bad shape. Nobody intervened. Many 
bystanders did not pay much attention to him, but some were 
laughing. Others said that it was good to see somebody like 
him in the midst of all the others who were just denying what 
really happened in the country. 
More civil society organizations followed. The “Association of 
Children and Young Workers in Partnership with the UNOCI” 
was a NGO that cooperated with the United Nation Peace Keep-
ing Forces. They had put one of the well-known development 
slogans on their banner: “Planning and Budgeting.” Represen-
tatives of immigrant communities also came with banners. The 
only international NGO still having a major project in Korhogo 
was Care. Its members paraded with wheelbarrows pushed by 
men and women with medical facemasks. The project was about 
garbage collection, but not very successful. 
Different groups of artisans displayed their work next. Weav-
ers from Waraniéné, once a tourist destination, held large 
painted canvasses, the smiths sat on a pick-up, hammering on an 
anvil, and finally, an association with the funny name of “Friends 
of Small Restaurants and Bars” displayed a signboard to the dig-
nitaries on the tribune. They also carried a national flag, but not 
with the official slogan of the country, “Union, Discipline, Tra-
vail” (“Unity, Discipline, Work”). They had replaced it by BVT, 
“Bon Vieux Temps” (“Good Old Times”). It was somewhere 
between a joke and a critique of the present state of the nation. 
I heard a spontaneous comment when they passed: “Yes, we all 
would like to eat first. That’s what we need, not war.” Appeals to 
peace, the national colors and maps of the country were very 
much present in the parade (Fig. 13). 
The parade ended with a defile of two horse riders and about 
twenty motorcycles. It became so loud that one of the horses 
refused to continue and tried to throw off its rider. Probably 
because of the noise, nobody noticed the preparations for a final 
act that would bring the entire ceremony to an end. 
Xylophone players and two men carrying a basket came in and 
stopped in front of the tribune, where they unloaded the bas-
ket. They brought out a kafigéléjo, a statue that is usually called 
a “fetish,” and presented it to the rebel commander (Fig. 14; see 
also Förster 1988:94–95). It was placed on the ground at the chief 
rebel commander’s feet. The men declared that the powers that 
the statue embodied would always be on the side of the right and 
just, i.e., on the side of the rebellion. The rebel leader received 
this promise and reminder with deep sincerity and said that the 
event was brought to a good end. Presenting such a statue to the 
rebel leader was, on the one hand, a break with the past, but at 
the other hand a reference to what was usually identified as “tra-
dition.” A kafigéléjo is generally kept in a small house and not 
displayed to the public. One can only approach it when there is 
a need to do so, when one has a serious problem. Literally trans-
lated, its name means “saying clear things”, which is a reminder 
that the client has to tell the truth when consulting a kafigéléjo. 
The statue represents a very powerful being that requires a cau-
tious handling. Exposing it in such a context was a deliberate 
choice and showed to all spectators how the statue should be 
used now, namely as a claim to “tradition.” It was a picture that 
this part of the regional visual culture should be integrated into 
the coming national identity. 
10  singer and musicians of the hunter association 
accompanying the masks. 2010.
 
vol. 45, no. 3 Autumn 2012 african arts  | 51
After the presentation of the kafigéléjo and as a response to the 
words of the rebel leader, a boloi troupe started to play its instru-
ments, performing the acrobatic dance of their masks while the 
rebel troops re-formed rows in the back (Fig. 15). They then car-
ried the Ivoirian flag back to the 4WDs. 
The staging of the nation as composed of a wide variety of dif-
ferent and to some degree diverging groups and associations was 
not entirely new in Korhogo. But it had never been put into one 
consistent framework. References to local culture and to global 
modernity complemented each other, though many elements 
did not really fit together. The claims to rational planning sur-
faced very prominently in the signboards of the NGOs that par-
ticipated in the parade. The counter-images came from the dozo 
hunters, who all wore their protective medicines on their shirts 
and bodies. The display of the kafigéléjo was a new framing for 
an old image, however. As a performance that was mainly based 
on the older model of independence parades, the ceremony 
nonetheless left a comparatively coherent image of what Côte 
d’Ivoire, with Korhogo as one of its bigger cities, should look like. 
I discussed the event with friends and with people who either 
supported the rebellion or hoped that the former postcolonial 
state would be restored. The perceptions were a little different, 
but within certain limits, most of my interlocutors agreed that 
there was a significant difference between what they had seen 
on the national, southern TV channel and what they had seen 
of independence ceremonies before the beginning of the crisis. 
The Southerners had also wanted to organize a parade—one that 
they had planned to simulcast directly from Abidjan. Actually, 
11  Cheer leader of Korhogo’s Club of young 
Women. 2010.
12 Woman demonstrating karate fighting to the 
rebel leader. 2010.
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the very small and almost insignificant display that was staged 
in Abidjan was perceived as by far inferior to what the rebels had 
organized in their part of the country. The South had visibly lost 
out in that competition—or in other words, the imagery that the 
rebels made use of proved to be much more persuasive than the 
conference that had taken place in Yamoussoukro in the days 
before August 7. What an Ivoirian nation could be was cast more 
in images than in an orally communicated discourse. 
Most of my interlocutors said that the festivities in the South 
did not have the same appeal as the festivities in Korhogo—and, 
of course, they were much smaller. Tellingly, many said so even 
though they had not seen them. Some added that what the reb-
els had organized was “different.” But that is an ambivalent term 
which would have needed further explanation. It brings me 
to my final discussion of what the event means to the political 
imagination and the social imaginary.   
AtteMpts to cover A DouBle DislocAtion  
Besides those who attended the ceremonies, there were quite 
a few inhabitants who said that they were not interested in such 
events. They refused to attend them. Many said it was because they 
could not afford to close their market shacks or restaurants. Oth-
ers said that they did not see any sense in organizing something 
like this if the country was heading towards economic decay and 
perhaps a political disaster in the elections planned for October 
and November that year. It is unfortunate that they were right, but 
that is another issue. What interests me more is that the disloca-
tion produced by Ivoirité and the rebellion that it instigated initi-
ated a quest for new identifications. That quest was answered by a 
new formation of pictures. Let me analyze the independence cere-
mony first as an event that brought different pictures together and 
then as a moment that links the past and the future or, in terms of 
social practice, memory and projectivity. 
13 so-called Waraniéné canvas with the map 
of Côte d’Ivoire and an appeal to peace. 2010.
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As performing art, the independence ceremony was a 
sequence of scenes that were framed by an overarching cho-
reography. This framework was largely set by how such cere-
monies had looked under the former postcolonial state. The 
parades, the presentations of uniforms, weapons, masks and 
dances, but also the mere display of physical strength by the 
judoka had had precursors. Some were directly appropriated 
from former independence ceremonies, others came from 
other events, such as the cultural festivals that were once orga-
nized by the urban councils in Côte d’Ivoire. Still others, for 
instance the cheerleading, originated in global culture or were 
instigated by the development world, such as the defile of NGO 
employees with their barrows. The entire ceremony looked 
very much like an amalgam of different elements of visual cul-
ture that were brought together to explore what the new nation 
could look like—in a very literal as well as in a figurative sense. 
The continuity of many pictures was obvious. They were mean-
ingful visual acts because they enacted to some extent the inde-
pendence ceremonies that had taken place at some past time 
and iterated them into the present (Connerton 1989:41–72). 
However, though related to the former state, the pictures 
increasingly referred to another signifier: it was no longer the 
state as an institution but statehood as a way of organizing soci-
ety.7 The imagery of the independence ceremonies apparently 
took up many old elements. However, they were no longer used 
in the same sense. While they remained references to a somewhat 
distant past, they had been submerged in the more recent insti-
tutionalization of rebel domination after the failed coup of 2002. 
There was a visible but unspoken distanciation8 from the former 
modes of state domination. Through participating in the perfor-
mance, the actors dissociated themselves from the mere habitual 
repetition of representational routines. They adopted a disruptive 
attitude towards the past and engaged in a new way to stage the 
nation—one that no longer built on the state as a centralized orga-
nization. What has happened since the beginning of the rebellion 
in 2002, and what became visible here in the ceremonial staging 
of the nation in a rebel-held area, was a space for a new political 
imagination—one that gave them the opportunity to participate in 
its formation. The double dislocation by Ivoirianness and later by 
the failed coup of 2002 initiated a double process. 
14 Kafigéléjo statue presented to Fofié 
Kouakou. 2010.
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First, it questioned the way Ivoirians had symbolically con-
structed their relations to the postcolonial state through an imag-
ery of the state as the institutional nodal point of their national 
identity. This was no longer possible, as most people in the now 
rebel-held area experienced the institution as repressive and 
unjust. The dislocating effect separated the nation from the state. 
It led to a (icono)clash between the imagery of the former state 
and the imageries that would emerge under rebel domination. 
Second, the double dislocation created the need for a rearticu-
lation of national identity in the rebel-held area. Because of the 
past with its hardening of identities, they wanted to articulate 
political claims to their identities within a possible new nation. 
Since the failure of the 2002 insurgency, it became evident that 
a discursive formation of a new national imagery could no lon-
ger merely repeat the former imagery of the postcolonial nation-
state with its displays of national emblems and symbols as flags, 
uniforms, and military parades. Yet this imagery was still pres-
ent in the minds of the people. It was a reference that the actors 
could make use of. They quoted it in the upcoming discursive 
formation of that novel nation.  
The real challenge of the double dislocation was that it called 
for a central theme, which could become the nodal point of the 
new political imagination. This nodal point has not emerged 
clearly yet. It became visible as a contour, not as a dominant idea 
with a hegemonic effect on the formation of political discourse. 
On the one hand, the complex and composite imagery, staged at 
Independence Day, reinforced the belief that a new social and 
political order was about to emerge. This new order became vis-
ible during the ceremony—and the audience experienced it by 
participating in the event.9 They were aware that this staging of 
the nation was different from the older ones and from those in 
the South. The imagery that everybody could experience indeed 
fostered the emerging imagination that an alternative social 
order is possible. Though limited, it hence had an emancipatory 
effect. Many spectators spontaneously commented on the cer-
emonies as an event that gave them new hope for the future. The 
sequence of the pictures had created to some extent an image, 
a mental idea of what an Ivoirian nation after the end of the 
nation-state could look like. As an image, it fed into the social 
imaginary of the spectators. Even one year later, after the end of 
the Gbagbo regime, some of them said that this event showed 
how all Ivoirians actually should live together. Though certainly 
only a small building stone, the power of the pictures had influ-
enced the normative imaginary of society.  
The actors participating in or attending the Independence 
Day ceremonies shared to considerable extent ideas of what they 
were heading for. The complementarity of the different social 
groups and actors was one, the chance to make a living another. 
The local was as present as the modern and the global, and both 
were part of the emerging political imagination. It was still a 
nation in the making, but it was surely no longer the nation of 
the postcolony. 
In his seminal work, Achille Mbembe (1992, 2002) argued that 
the postcolony is an inevitable state of society and rejected the 
dichotomy of oppression and resistance in favor of an all-perva-
sive banality of power. The postcolony is, he wrote, “chaotically 
pluralistic,” but still shows an internal coherence (1992:3). In this 
sense, the tension between imagery and imagination would be 
endless, not leading anywhere but to simulacra and improviza-
tion. His conceptualization of the African present is perhaps 
realistic—but it is highly pessimistic, too, not leaving any space 
for collective agency. 
In the case of the rebel-held Ivoirian North, it may be too early 
to claim that this depiction of the African present is wrong. But 
there are some signs that the discursive formation may lead to 
more than just a vicious cycle of the same old story. The majority 
of the population has an image of a better social order in mind 
that they want to defend. When the country slipped into the 
15 Boloi dance troupe and masks. 2010.
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Notes
1 The term is a loanword from French and stands 
for l’énoncé, which is also translated as “statement” 
(Foucault 2002). 
2 There is a whole body of literature on how 
pictures evocate sense. Outstanding contributions are 
Belting 2001, Boehm 2007, Bredekamp 2010, Mitchell 
2005. 
3 The conference took place shortly before the 
anniversary, from August 1–4. It was a highly politicized 




(accessed July 16, 2011).  
4 There were more official ceremonies abroad 
than in the southern parts of the country, as a look at 
a news website quickly shows: http://news.abidjan.net/
dossiers/dossier.asp?id=1402 (accessed July 16, 2011). 
See also N’Guessan 2010:64. 
5 The dozo are usually described as a traditional 
hunter association. They claim that they are direct 
descendants of the hunters of medieval Mali (Hellweg 
2004, 2011). However, the continuity to medieval Mali is 
largely a discursive construction.  
6 Programme du Service Civique National. 
7 Like Migdal (2001), I distinguish between the 
state as an organization and statehood as the normal-
ized practices that it generates and that shape its under-
standing. 
8 I adapt distanciation from Harvey (1985, 1989) 
and not from Giddens. Unlike Harvey, however, I 
ground it in an actor-centered understanding of the 
social. As an intentional act, it does not mean forgetful-
ness (Connerton 2009). 
9 On ethnography and experience as method-
ological instruments see Förster et al. 2011.
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most recent crisis with an increasingly excessive use of violence 
in Abidjan and the West, many of my friends and partners in 
Korhogo insisted that they knew what they had already achieved 
over the past eight years—a reliable social order that guaranteed 
safety in a calm and peaceful city. They would defend it, they 
said. A lot still needed to be done; poverty, in particular, was a 
challenge, they added. The political imagination is certainly not 
fully articulated yet—but it exists and informs more than one 
local initiative to preserve what they have already achieved. At a 
more theoretical level, it meant that their agency built to a large 
extent on the formation of a coherent image—an image that 
related different social identities. It was part of a discursive for-
mation and still played a role in it. But as picture and image, the 
independence ceremonies preserved a distinct, visual character. 
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